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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JUSTIN BRENT PETERSON, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
-vs-
SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD, 
CHIEF PAUL CUNNINGHAM, SALT 
LAKE COUNTY JAIL, and 
TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICE COURT, 
Respondents and Appellees. 
Case No. 20070238 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICE COURT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1: Are unusual circumstances present that justify a collateral attack on a 
criminal sentence, where petitioner Justin Brent Peterson ("Peterson") did not 
present a scintilla of evidence to support his counsel's allegation that he was 
denied his right to the assistance of counsel? 
Issue 2: Did the court of appeals err in concluding, based on Peterson's written 
waiver of his right to counsel, that some evidence existed that Peterson waived 
his right to counsel, thus shifting the burden onto Peterson to overcome his 
conviction's presumption of regularity? 
Issue 3: Whether the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that Peterson failed 
to meet his burden to overcome his conviction's presumption of regularity, where 
Peterson failed to testify that his waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case is on appeal pursuant to this Court's Amended Order dated July 
3, 2007 granting Peterson's petition for writ of certiorari. "On certiorari," this Court 
reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district court. We 
conduct that review for correctness, ceding no deference to the court of appeals." 
State v. Von Ferguson. 2007 UT 1 (citations omitted). 
TEXT OF SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below 
This case is the result of Justin Brent Peterson ("Peterson") filing a petition 
for post-conviction relief based on an alleged denial of his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel. In February, 2000, Peterson was cited for possession of a controlled 
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Exhibit 8. 
On July 18, 2000 (two days before he was scheduled for trial), Peterson 
appeared voluntarily in the Taylorsville Justice Court to plead guilty to the 
charges against him. R. 145:40, 44; Exhibit 8. Peterson read and signed a 
document entitled Defendant's Waiver of Constitutional Rights (Exhibit 7), which 
included the waiver of Peterson's right to counsel. R. 145:27, 41. Taylorsville 
Justice Court Judge Michael W. Kwan then went through his "typical" Rule 11 
colloquy with Peterson, and Peterson entered a guilty plea to the charges against 
him. R. 145:57-58; Exhibit 8. 
About two years later, on August 9, 2002, Peterson filed a petition for post-
conviction relief (the "Petition"), claiming that Peterson "was sentenced to jail in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Alabama 
v. Shelton. 122 S.Ct. 1764 (2002)." R. 1. Although the Petition was supported by 
a memorandum of law, it was not supported by any affidavits or other sworn 
statements. See R. 1-9. Significantly, Peterson had not previously challenged 
his sentence through the avenue of a trial de novo in the district court. 
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On January 17, 2003, Judge Sandra N. Peuler of the Third District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, held a hearing on the Petition. On 
February 20, 2003, the district court entered its order dismissing the Petition, 
finding that Peterson did not meet his burden of proof and that Peterson made a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. R. 118. 
Peterson appealed the dismissal of his Petition to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. R. 132-33. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Peterson's post-
conviction "challenge to his justice court convictions is barred by his failure to 
seek a trial de novo in the district court." Peterson v. Kennard. 2007 UT App 26, 
I117, 156 P.3d 834. The court of appeals also ruled that "[a]s an alternative 
ground upon which to affirm the district court's denial of Peterson's PCRA [Post-
Conviction Remedies Act] action, we note that the record contains ample 
evidence to support the district court's determination that Peterson failed to prove 
a violation of his right to have counsel present at his justice court hearing." \± 
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II. Statement of the Facts 
A. Events Leading to Peterson's Guilty Plea 
On or about February 24, 2000, Peterson was cited for possession of a 
controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. Exhibit 8. Peterson has never 
challenged the substance of the charged offenses. See Exhibit 8; R. 145:11-12 
("We are not challenging the conviction in this case. We are solely challenging 
the sentence .. .") . 
On March 21, 2000, Peterson requested admission to the Taylorsville 
Substance Abuse Program. Exhibit 6; Exhibit 8. The Taylorsville Substance 
Abuse Program provides that upon acceptance and admission to the program 
that the applicant plead guilty and the guilty plea is held in abeyance pending 
successful completion of the program. See Exhibit 6. Upon completion of the 
program the plea will be withdrawn and charges dismissed. See jd. Peterson 
signed, completed and submitted an "Application for Admission to City of 
Taylorsville Substance Abuse Court" (the "Application"). Exhibit 6. The 
Application included the following paragraph which Peterson initialed: "Counsel. I 
have the right to consult with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge 
were to determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge 
could appoint one to represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was 
able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me." kL 
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The Application also notified Peterson, among other things, of his right to a 
jury trial, that he was presumed innocent, that Taylorsville was required to prove 
the elements of his crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and that his conviction 
could be used to enhance penalties for any future convictions, ki 
Under the Taylorsville Justice Court's supervision, Peterson attended 
weekly drug court reviews from late March through late June 2000. Exhibit 8. 
On June 27, 2000, the Taylorsville Justice Court determined that Peterson 
could not participate further in the Taylorsville Substance Abuse Program, and his 
case was set for trial on July 20, 2000. Id The docket from the Taylorsville 
Justice Court shows that Peterson appeared before Judge Michael W. Kwan 
("Judge Kwan") at least seven times between March and June 27, 2000. ]d 
On July 18, 2000 (two days before his scheduled trial), Peterson appeared 
voluntarily in the Taylorsville Justice Court to plead guilty to these charges. R. 
145:40, 44; Exhibit 8. Peterson testified that he was familiar with Judge Kwan by 
the time Peterson appeared before him on July 18, 2000. R. 145:33. Peterson 
also acknowledged that he "had appeared numerous times in front of Judge 
Kwan" before July 18, 2000. R.145:41. Likewise, Judge Kwan was also very 
familiar with Peterson. R. 145:55, 58-59. Peterson had "been a defendant" in 
Judge Kwan's court "for probably over a year on other matters." R. 145:59. 
The "other matters" to which Judge Kwan referred related to charges 
brought against Peterson for (i) failing to stop at a controlled intersection in 1999 
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(Exhibit 1); (ii) playing loud music in 1999 (Exhibit 3); and (iii) failing to pay the 
fine associated with the failure to stop at a controlled intersection charges, 
resulting in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest (Exhibit 1). On February 24, 
2000 (six months before Peterson agreed to plead guilty on the charges at issue 
in this case), Peterson was arrested and brought to Judge Kwan's court. JpL At 
this February 24, 2000 hearing, Judge Kwan advised Peterson of his Rule 11 
rights, Peterson signed a "Defendant's Waiver of Constitutional Rights" and 
pleaded guilty to the failure to stop charges. Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2; R. 145:31. Also 
on February 24, 2000, Peterson signed a separate "Defendant's Waiver of 
Constitutional Rights" and pleaded guilty to charges against him for "loud music." 
Exhibit 3. Peterson waived his right to counsel with respect to both of the 
charges to which he pleaded guilty on February 24, 2000. Exhibit 2; Exhibit 3. 
Moreover, in June 2000, Peterson pleaded guilty in the Midvale Justice 
Court to (i) reckless driving, possession of a controlled substance and possession 
of paraphernalia, and (ii) driving on a denied driver's license and failure to 
appear. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5; R. 145:30. At this June 2000 hearing, the Midvale 
Justice Court advised Peterson of his rights and he waived his right to counsel in 
both of these cases. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5. 
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B. Peterson's Guilty Plea 
On July 18, 2000, two days before his scheduled trial, Peterson appeared 
voluntarily in the Taylorsville Justice Court to plead guilty to the charges of 
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 
145:40, 44; Exhibit 8. Peterson entered Judge Kwan's courtroom, and remained 
there while Judge Kwan completed his afternoon calendar of about thirty to fifty 
cases. R: 145:59, 62. 
After Judge Kwan completed his calendar, he wondered why Peterson 
remained in the courtroom. R. 145:64. Peterson's case was not scheduled for 
hearing that day. R. 145:59. Peterson said he wanted "to take care of his case, 
and did not want to come back for his trial. R. 145:73. Judge Kwan told him to 
take the written Defendant's Waiver of Constitutional Rights (Exhibit 7) (the 
"Waiver") and "sit down and read it." R. 145:74. Peterson "was not happy" that 
Judge Kwan made him read the Waiver. R. 145:73. 
Peterson acknowledged he signed the Waiver, R. 145:27,41, which stated 
in part: 
COUNSEL. I have the right to consult with and be 
represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am 
too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one 
to represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be 
required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
Exhibit 7. Peterson signed his initials after this paragraph, indicating that he 
affirmatively waived his right to counsel. 
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The Waiver further informed Peterson of his right to a jury trial, his right to 
an appeal, that he was presumed innocent, that each element of the charged 
offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that by entering a plea 
he could face enhanced penalties for future convictions. ]a\ 
In addition to the Waiver, Peterson also executed a document entitled 
"Possession of Controlled Substance (marijuana)." Exhibit 9. This document 
explained the elements of the offense of possession of a controlled substance, 
described the applicable penalties for the crime, and the enhanced penalties that 
could apply to Peterson in the future. ]d 
Judge Kwan remained on the bench while Peterson read, signed, and 
initialed the Waiver. R. 145:74. Judge Kwan testified that he knew "for a fact" 
that Peterson read the Waiver. R. 145:59. 
After Peterson read, signed, and initialed his Waiver, Judge Kwan went 
through his "typical" Rule 11 colloquy twice with Peterson. R. 145:57-58. The 
reason Judge Kwan went through his Rule 11 colloquy twice is that Peterson had 
two separate criminal cases pending against him in Taylorsville (possession of a 
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia), and he chose to 
plead guilty in both cases. See R. 115. 
The docket of the Taylorsville Justice Court confirms that Peterson was 
advised of his Rule 11 rights. Exhibit 8. Judge Kwan testified that his Rule 11 
colloquy included the following: 
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Judge Kwan asked Peterson if he actually read the Waiver. R. 
145:55-56. 
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if he read and understood the English 
language. R. 145:56. 
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if he understood that by entering a 
plea, Peterson would be giving up or waiving each of the 
constitutional rights listed on the Waiver, id 
Judge Kwan informed Peterson that he could go to jail, Ja\ 
Judge Kwan informed Peterson that if he wanted an attorney and 
could not afford one, "there was a process that we could go through 
to see if [Peterson] qualified to have one appointed [for him] at little 
or no cost." R. 145:56-57. 
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if anybody promised him anything to 
induce him to enter his plea. R. 145:56. 
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if anyone threatened him or forced him 
to enter his plea. ]a\ 
In addition, when Judge Kwan called his cases individually, he reads to the 
defendant "the charges, the date that it allegedly occurred, location." R. 145:55. 
Peterson admitted in his testimony that Judge Kwan advised him of most of 
these rights. R. 145:42-50. Specifically: 
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Peterson testified that Judge Kwan told him "that by entering a guilty 
plea in this case that it could be used later to enhance another 
conviction." R. 145: 42. 
Peterson testified that Judge Kwan asked if he read and understood 
the English language. R. 145:49-50. 
Peterson testified that Judge Kwan asked if he understood that by 
entering a guilty plea he was giving up the rights in the Waiver. R. 
145:50. 
Peterson testified that Judge Kwan discussed "the consequences of 
a guilty plea . . .the fact that you could be sentenced to jail." Jd 
Peterson testified that Judge Kwan explained "how long [Peterson] 
could be sentenced to jail before [he] entered [his] guilty plea." Jd. 
Peterson testified that Judge Kwan said that if he "couldn't afford a 
lawyer and if [he] wanted one, the Court would appoint one." R. 
145:42. 
Peterson testified that Judge Kwan asked if he wanted a lawyer, R. 
145:49, and Peterson indicated that he did not want a lawyer, jd 
Based on Judge Kwan's close familiarity with Peterson through this case 
and other cases, Judge Kwan concluded that Peterson "understood his rights." 
R. 145:60. Indeed, Judge Kwan "would not have gone forward" had he "even 
suspected" that Peterson did not understand his rights. ]d 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The crux of this appeal is whether a naked allegation that a defendant was 
denied his right to counsel, without even a scintilla of supporting evidence, is 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity that attaches to a criminal 
conviction. 
It is undisputed in this case that Peterson was convicted in the Taylorsville 
Justice Court and that he failed to avail himself of his right to a trial de novo in 
district court. Under this Court's precedents, Peterson's claim for post-conviction 
relief is therefore barred unless he can demonstrate that "unusual circumstances" 
excuse his failure to exhaust his legal remedies. 
There are no unusual circumstances in this case. As a threshold matter, 
Peterson's claim that he was deprived of his right to counsel is not facially 
plausible. He did not testify that he did not waive his right to counsel, or that his 
waiver was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. The mere fact that Peterson 
was not represented by counsel does not constitute unusual circumstances. This 
Court should not permit the unusual circumstances exception to swallow the rule, 
thus undermining the policy in favor of the finality of criminal convictions. 
But even if this Court were to find that unusual circumstances were 
present, the court of appeals was correct in alternatively ruling that the 
presumption of regularity attaches to Peterson's conviction. There is ample 
evidence that Peterson waived his right to counsel, and the court of appeals did 
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not err in finding that Peterson's written waiver of his right to counsel constituted 
evidence sufficient to cloak Peterson's conviction with the presumption of 
regularity. The court of appeals properly found that the evidence presented by 
Peterson, including his own self-serving testimony, was inadequate to overcome 
the presumption of regularity. There is no evidence in the record that Peterson's 
plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. 
Nevertheless, should this Court determine that Peterson adduced sufficient 
evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity, the record demonstrates that 
Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel comported with constitutional standards. 
Peterson was advised of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to 
counsel, and the range of punishments possible upon his guilty plea. These 
warnings satisfy the requirements of Iowa v. Tovar. 541 U.S. 77 (2004) to waive 
the right to counsel in the context of a guilty plea. And even if this Court's pre-
Tovar requirements were applied, the record shows that Peterson was 
adequately advised concerning his rights to make a knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Peterson's Constitutional Claim Is Not Facially Plausible, and 
Therefore No Unusual Circumstances Are Present that Could Justify 
Post-Conviction Relief 
A. This Court Rejects Post-Conviction Challenges that Are Not 
Facially Plausible 
Peterson contends that a mere naked allegation that a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel was violated is sufficient to constitute unusual 
circumstances that justify post-conviction review. Peterson is wrong. This Court 
requires a facially plausible allegation of a constitutional violation, and Peterson's 
claim is not facially plausible because he produced no evidence in the district 
court to support his claim. 
Under this Court's procedural bar jurisprudence, defendants are not eligible 
for post-conviction relief unless they first exhaust their legal remedies. Lucero v. 
Kennard. 2005 UT 79, U 32,125 P.3d 917. Justice court defendants must pursue 
a trial de novo to exhaust their legal remedies. Ja\atU41. Peterson did not 
pursue a trial de novo, and therefore his constitutional challenge to his sentence 
is barred unless he can demonstrate that "unusual circumstances" excuse his 
failure to exhaust his legal remedies. See |g\ at U 42. 
"To qualify for the unusual circumstances exception to the procedural bar 
rules, a petitioner must demonstrate that 'an obvious injustice or a substantial and 
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right' has occurred." i d at U 45 (quoting 
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Carter v. Galetka. 2001 UT 96, ^  15, 44 P.3d 626). Claims that constitutional 
rights were violated, without more, do not automatically rise to the level of 
unusual circumstances. See Benvenuto v. State. 2007 UT 53, flU 27-35, 582 
Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (ineffective assistance of counsel claim time barred); 
Gardner v. Galetka. 2004 UT 42, U 16, 94 P.3d 263 (ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim not an unusual circumstance where it was not facially plausible); 
Rudolph v. Galetka. 2002 UT 7,1ffl 3, 6,43 P.3d 467 (claim that defendant was 
denied right to represent himself not constitute an unusual circumstance); 
Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d 608, 614 (Utah 1995) (meritless constitutional 
claims that court should have advised defendant of right to remain silent and that 
defendant's due process rights violated, were not unusual circumstances). 
This Court has made it clear that it does not consider whether unusual 
circumstances exist where the claim is not "facially plausible." Gardner v. 
Galetka. 2007 UT 3, H 30,151 P.3d 968; Gardner v. Galetka. 2004 UT42, fl 16, 
94 P.2d 263. Were it otherwise, the "unusual circumstances" exception would 
swallow the rule that a defendant must first exhaust legal remedies before 
seeking post-conviction relief. A justice court defendant could challenge a 
sentence years after it was issued based on a claimed constitutional violation, 
without a scintilla of supporting evidence. If this Court's procedural bar 
jurisprudence has any vitality, a defendant must have some evidence to support a 
post-conviction challenge, or that challenge must be precluded. 
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B. Peterson's Claim that He Was Deprived of His Right to Counsel 
Is Not Facially Plausible 
This Court's recent decision in State v. Von Ferguson clarified the minimal 
evidentiary burden that is required to rebut the presumption of regularity that 
attaches to a criminal conviction. 2007 UT 1,5J 40-41. To meet this minimal 
evidentiary burden established by Von Ferguson. Peterson is required to "present 
'some evidence that he . . . was not represented by counsel and did not 
knowingly waive counsel.'" Jd at H 40 (quoting State v. Triptow. 770 P.2d 146, 
149 (Utah 1989)). The Von Ferguson Court further clarified that the requirement 
of "'some evidence' may be satisfied by a defendant's own testimony." i d 
The evidence presented by Peterson in the district court did not satisfy the 
minimal evidentiary burden established by this Court in Von Ferguson. It is true 
that the only evidence presented by Peterson was his self-serving testimony. 
However, nowhere in his testimony does Peterson claim that he did not waive his 
right to counsel or that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. 
Peterson has never claimed that his waiver was involuntary; or that he did not 
understand what he was doing when he waived his right to counsel; or that he 
lacked the intelligence to understand the consequences of the waiver of the right 
to counsel.1 
1
 While Peterson's counsel made statements to this effect, R. 145:15,17, 
these statements were not supported by evidence and have no evidentiary value 
Peterson's evidence (consisting solely of his own testimony) did not include any 
testimony that his waiver was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. 
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Peterson's Petition (R. 1) fails to assert that his waiver was not knowing, 
voluntary, or intelligent. At most, the unverified Petition asserts that Peterson 
"was sentenced to jail in violation of the Sixth Amendment." |g\ Likewise, not 
once in Peterson's testimony did he claim that his waiver was not knowing, 
voluntary, or intelligent. See R. 145:25-51. This case is thus easily 
distinguishable from Von Ferguson because the defendant in Von Ferguson 
testified that he did not waive his right to counsel. Von Ferguson. 2007 UT 1 at If 
41. By contrast, Peterson admitted in his testimony that he waived his right to 
counsel. R. 145:41-42,45-46,49. 
The question is thus whether Peterson's counsel's naked allegations of a 
constitutional violation are sufficient to meet Peterson's burden to demonstrate 
that his waiver of the right to counsel was invalid. The United States Supreme 
Court considered this issue in Iowa v. Tovar. 541 U.S. 77 (2004). Tovar. like the 
instant case, arose out of a "collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction." Jd. 
at 92. The Court recognized that in this procedural context, "it is the defendant's 
burden to prove that he did not completely and intelligently waive his right to the 
assistance of counsel." ]g\ The Court noted that the defendant "has never 
claimed that he did not fully understand the charge or the range of punishment for 
the crime prior to pleading guilty," jcL nor did the defendant "assert that he was 
unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment." ]a\ at 93. 
Instead, the defendant in Tovar maintained that his waiver of counsel was invalid 
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because the trial court had inadequately warned him of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, id at 85. In a unanimous decision, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Iowa Supreme Court's holding that the defendant's 
waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights was invalid, id at 94. 
Peterson is in a similar situation to the Tovar defendant, as Peterson never 
claimed that his waiver of his right to counsel was not voluntary, knowing, or 
intelligent. In the absence of any evidence that Peterson's waiver of counsel was 
not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent, Peterson has failed to meet his burden to 
prove his waiver of Sixth Amendment rights was invalid. Cf Moench v. State. 
2004 UT App 57, fflfl, 16-18, 88 P.3d 353 (considering merits of petition for post-
conviction relief where defendant claimed that he did not enter "a voluntary and 
knowledgeable guilty plea"). 
Peterson has utterly failed to meet his minimal evidentiary burden to show 
that his waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 
Peterson has the acknowledged burden of introducing evidence that his waiver of 
counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. He has admitted that his 
waiver was voluntary, and he had not testified or otherwise produced evidence to 
show that his waiver was not knowing or intelligent. Peterson's post-conviction 
collateral attack on his sentence is not facially plausible. 
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C. The Fact that Peterson Was Not Represented by Counsel Does 
Not Represent "Unusual Circumstances" to Justify His Failure 
to Seek a Trial De Novo 
Peterson cites to exactly one fact that he claims constitutes "unusual 
circumstances": he was not represented by counsel in the justice court 
proceedings. But Peterson does not cite a single case which has found that a 
convicted defendant's pro se status, standing alone, was sufficient to meet the 
"unusual circumstances" exception to the exhaustion of remedies requirement. 
Taylorsville respectfully submits that this Court should construe the 
"unusual circumstances" exception as an exception. It is the exception to the 
rule, reserved for cases that fall outside the norm. If Peterson's argument were 
accepted, then every single pro se defendant would effectively have an unlimited 
period of time to collaterally challenge their convictions. This "would allow that 
exception to swallow up the rule, thereby transforming habeas corpus from an 
extraordinary remedy into an alternative appeal mechanism in contravention of 
the finality of criminal judgments that is the settled policy of this state." Codianna 
v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Utah 1983). 
The cases Peterson relies upon to the contrary are distinguishable. 
Several of them are cases involving the ineffective assistance of counsel, which 
present very different considerations. One of the cases Peterson cites, Rudolph 
v. Galetka. points out that "'[wjhen trial counsel represents [a] defendant on 
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appeal an ineffective assistance claim cannot be raised because it is 
unreasonable to expect [trial counsel] to raise the issue of [her] own 
ineffectiveness at trial on direct appeal.'" 2002 UT 7, U 7,43 P.3d 467 (quoting 
State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900, 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). Indeed, in another 
case Peterson cites, Chess v. Smith, the defendant's counsel advised the 
defendant "that he stood 'a substantial chance' of receiving a much harsher 
sentence upon retrial and thus was advised not to pursue an appeal." 617 P.2d 
341, 343 (Utah 1980). This Court stated that "[t]his advice was clearly contrary to 
the law." \± These abuses that are inherent in an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim are simply not present where a defendant proceeds pjro se. 
Other cases relied on by Peterson are within the class of "numerous Utah 
cases which have addressed the merits of habeas claims even though the issues 
raised were known or should have been known to petitioner and his counsel at 
the time of conviction and should have been raised on appeal." Codianna. 660 
P.2d at 1114 (Stewart, J., concurring). Brown v. Turner. 440 P.2d 968 (Utah 
1968) and Webster v. Jones. 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978) fall within this class. See 
Codianna. 660 P.2d at 1114 (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding that "[a] reading" of 
[Brown v. Turner] makes clear that the petitioner either knew or should have 
known at the time of his conviction of those errors that were later asserted in his 
habeas petition.") None of these decisions found any unusual circumstances 
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present to justify the defendant's failure to raise Sixth Amendment claims on 
direct appeal. 
This Court's recent decision of Benvenuto v. State. 2007 UT 53, 582 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 22, presented facts very similar to the instant case. There, a 
defendant "waited several years after the expiration of the PCRA limitations 
period to file his petition for post-conviction relief." id at U 33. The defendant 
argued that his delay was justified because he could not afford to retain an 
attorney. IdL This Court found that this justification was "simply inadequate," and 
that the defendant did not "meet the interests of justice exception to the statute of 
limitations. As such, his claims are time barred under the PCRA." id at ffl[ 
34-35. 
Like the petitioner in Benvenuto. Peterson's p_ro se status alone is 
insufficient to create "unusual circumstances." There is no reason that Peterson 
could not have sought a trial de novo and subsequently requested the 
appointment of counsel to assist Peterson in pursuing his claims. Jd at U 34. In 
the absence of "unusual circumstances," Peterson's claims are barred by his 
failure to first pursue a trial de novo. 
21 
II. Should this Court Reach the Merits of Peterson's Petition, it Should 
Affirm the Court of Appeals' Ruling that Peterson Failed to Prove a 
Violation of His Right to Counsel 
A. The Presumption of Regularity Attaches to Peterson's 
Conviction Because There Is Ample Evidence that Peterson 
Waived His Right to Counsel 
This Court has recently clarified the burdens of proof that apply where a 
defendant challenges an uncounseled conviction based on an alleged deprivation 
of the defendant's right to counsel. In Lucero v. Kennard. this Court ruled that a 
"court may not presume waiver of the right to counsel unless there is some 
evidence that the defendant affirmatively acquiesced to the waiver of counsel." 
2005 UT 79, H 25,125 P.3d 917. Furthermore, in State v. Von Ferguson, this 
ruling was clarified: "it is impermissible to presume a waiver of counsel where a 
trial record is silent on the issue of waiver." 2007 UT 1, If 37. The court of 
appeals in this case correctly allocated the burdens of proof: "where there is 
some evidence that a defendant has acquiesced in the trial court's failure to 
appoint counsel, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to establish that he 
did not validly waive his right to counsel." Peterson v. Kennard. 2007 UT App 26, 
1|14, 156P.3d834. 
Thus, the threshold question is whether there is "some evidence" that 
Peterson waived his right to counsel. The court of appeals focused on the 
Waiver, which is perhaps the strongest evidence of Peterson's waiver of his right 
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to counsel. Indeed, Peterson admitted that he signed the Waiver, R. 145:27, 41, 
which stated in part: 
COUNSEL. I have the right to consult with and be 
represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am 
too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one 
to represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be 
required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
Exhibit 7. Peterson signed his initials after this paragraph, indicating that he 
affirmatively waived his right to counsel. 
Although certainly the Waiver is sufficient standing alone to constitute 
"some evidence" that Peterson waived his right to counsel, the record in this case 
is replete with evidence of Peterson's waiver. This includes the justice court's 
docket entry, which indicates that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 rights. 
Exhibit 8. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-122 (2002): "Entries in a justice 
court judge's docket under Section 78-5-121, certified by the judge or his 
successor in office, are prima facie evidence of the facts stated." Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11 (e) provides in part that a court may not accept a guilty plea unless the 
judge has found that "if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she 
has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel." 
Accordingly, the docket constitutes prima facie evidence that Peterson knowingly 
waived his right to counsel. 
Moreover, Peterson admitted in his testimony that he waived his right to 
counsel. R. 145:41-42,45-46, 49. Furthermore, in connection with the charges 
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at issue, Peterson also signed an "Application for Admission to City of Taylorsville 
Substance Abuse Court" (the "Application"). Exhibit 6. The Application included 
the following paragraph which Peterson initialed: "Counsel. I have the right to 
consult with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine 
that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to 
represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay 
for the appointed lawyer's service to me." l i 
The evidence that Peterson waived his right to counsel far exceeded this 
Court's minimal "some evidence" standard. The court of appeals in this case 
correctly found that the Waiver "alone is sufficient to evidence Peterson's 
affirmative acquiescence in the justice court's failure to appoint counsel and shift 
the burden of establishing a Sixth Amendment violation onto Peterson." Peterson 
v. Kennard. 2007 UT App 26, fl 16, 156 P.3d 834. 
B. Peterson Failed to Adduce Any Evidence that He Did Not Waive 
His Right to Counsel or that His Waiver Was Not Knowing, 
Voluntary, and Intelligent 
To rebut the presumption of regularity that attaches to Peterson's 
conviction, it is his burden to come forward with "some evidence to rebut the 
presumption of regularity." State v. Von Ferguson. 2007 UT 1, fl 41. It is not 
enough for Peterson to "merely produce a copy of the conviction reflecting that he 
was not represented by counsel." Jg\ Thus, in Von Ferguson, a defendant's 
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testimony that he "did not waive his right to counsel" was sufficient to overcome 
the presumption of regularity. ]a\ 
It is true that Peterson testified in the district court concerning the 
circumstances of his guilty plea. But in stark contrast to Von Ferguson. Peterson 
admitted in his testimony that his plea was voluntary. R. 145:41-42, 45-46, 49. 
Peterson did not testify that he did not waive his right to counsel. Likewise, not 
once in Peterson's testimony did he claim that his waiver was not knowing, 
voluntary, or intelligent. See R. 145:25-51. 
Given the presumption of regularity, and in the absence of even a scintilla 
of evidence to rebut the presumption, Peterson's conviction must stand. The 
court of appeals correctly concluded that "Peterson failed to meet his burden of 
proving a violation" of his right to counsel. Peterson v. Kennard. 2007 UT App 
26,1|16, 156 P.3d 834. 
C. Even Assuming Peterson Produced Evidence to Rebut the 
Presumption of Regularity, His Waiver of Counsel Was 
Constitutionally Valid 
1. Standards for Waiver of the Right to Counsel 
Peterson's argument focuses on a rigid mantra that he claims a court must 
recite for a waiver of the right to counsel to be valid. The United States Supreme 
Court rejected a similar argument that a court must conduct a specific colloquy for 
the waiver of the right to counsel to be effective. See Iowa v. Tovar. 541 U.S. 77, 
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88 (2004) ("We have not, however, prescribed any formula or script to be read to 
a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel"). To the 
contrary, "[t]he information a defendant must possess in order to make an 
intelligent decision . . . will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including 
the defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature 
of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding." |a\; accord State v. Pedockie. 
2006 UT 28, H 40, 137 P.3d 716 ("we have recognized that the validity of a 
defendant's waiver turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding 
each case"). 
In the context of the waiver of counsel to enter a guilty plea, the Sixth 
Amendment "is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of 
the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of 
the range of allowable punishments attendant upon entry of a guilty plea." Tovar. 
541 U.S. at 81. The United States Supreme Court clarified that a more searching 
colloquy is required where a defendant seeks to proceed through trial pio se. 
id, at 90: cf. State v. Pedockie. 2006 UT 28,ffl[42, 50, 51, 137 P.3d 716 
(requiring a more searching colloquy where defendant seeks to proceed through 
trial pio se). 
However, "at earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or 
formal colloquy may suffice." Tovar. 541 U.S. at 89. This is so "not because 
pretrial proceedings are 'less important' than trial, but because, at that stage, 'the 
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full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and 
more obvious to the accused than they are at trial.'" id at 90 (quoting Patterson v. 
Illinois. 487 U.S. 285, 299 (1988)). 
Before the Tovar decision, this Court ruled that "before a defendant can 
waive the right to counsel, 'the defendant "should be made aware of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that.. . he knows what he is doing 
and his choice is made with eyes open."'" State v. Arauelles. 2003 UT 1, 1J 70, 63 
P.2d 731 (quoting State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183,187 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). To establish the validity of a 
waiver of the right to counsel, trial courts should do the following: 
(1) advise the defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance 
of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to defend himself; (2) 
ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity 
to understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to 
represent himself, including the expectation that the defendant will 
comply with technical rules and the recognition that presenting a 
defense is not just a matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain 
that the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and 
proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any 
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case. 
State v. Arauelles. 2003 UT 1,1J 70, 63 P.2d 731 (quoting State v. Heaton. 958 
P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998)). 
Taylorsville contends that Tovar overruled Utah precedent to the extent 
Utah cases may require a more searching colloquy to waive the right to counsel 
in the context of a guilty plea. See Tovar. 541 U.S. at 81 (overruling Iowa 
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Supreme Court's requirement of two specific warnings that were not necessary 
under the Sixth Amendment).2 However, as will be demonstrated below, even if 
the more detailed requirements of the pre-Tovar Utah precedent are applied, 
Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel was valid. 
2. Peterson's Waiver of Counsel Was Valid Under the Tovar 
Court's Standards 
Tovar enunciated the standard for a valid waiver of the right to counsel in 
the context of entering a guilty plea as follows: "The constitutional requirement is 
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges 
against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of 
allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea." JdL The 
constitutional requirement was satisfied in this case. 
First, Peterson was informed of the nature of the charges against him. It is 
undisputed that Peterson signed Exhibit 9, which indicates that Peterson was 
charged with possession of controlled substance. Moreover, when Judge Kwan 
called Peterson's case, he read to Peterson "the charges, the date that it 
allegedly occurred, location." R. 145:55. It is also clear that Peterson knew the 
nature of the charges against him based on the Waiver, which contained a 
handwritten notation (presumably Peterson's own handwritten notation) near the 
2
 Peterson has not challenged his sentence on the basis of the Utah 
Constitution, instead, he has relied solely on the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. See R. 1-5; Peterson's Brief at 1-2. 
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top of the Waiver "POCS + PODP," or possession of controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. Exhibit 7. Moreover, Peterson has never 
contended that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him. 
The docket of the Taylorsville Justice Court independently satisfies this 
requirement. The docket indicated that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 
rights. Exhibit 8. Further, the district court found that Peterson was advised of 
his Rule 11 rights twice on July 18, 2000. R. 115. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-5-122 (2002): "Entries in a justice court judge's docket under Section 78-5-
121, certified by the judge or his successor in office, are prima facie evidence of 
the facts stated." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) provides in part that a court may not 
accept a guilty plea unless the judge has found that "the defendant understands 
the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered ..." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11 (e)(4)(A). Accordingly, the docket constitutes prima facie evidence 
that Peterson was informed of the nature of the charges against him. 
Second, Peterson was informed of his right to be counseled regarding his 
plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(1) requires a judge to determine that "if the 
defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the 
right to counsel and does not desire counsel." Since the docket (Exhibit 8) 
indicates that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 rights, the docket is prima 
facie evidence that Peterson knowingly waived his right to counsel. 
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The evidence in the district court was consistent with the docket entry. 
Peterson admitted in his testimony that Judge Kwan told him that if he "couldn't 
afford a lawyer and if [he] wanted one, the Court would appoint one for [him]." R. 
145:42. Peterson also conceded that Judge Kwan asked if Peterson wanted a 
lawyer, R. 145:49, and Peterson indicated that he did not want a lawyer. JkL. 
Further, the Waiver Peterson executed advised him: "I have the right to consult 
with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am 
too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to represent 
me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me." Exhibit 7. Finally, Peterson executed the 
Application (Exhibit 6) which also informed him of his right to counsel. 
Third, Peterson was advised of the range of allowable punishments 
attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(5) requires a 
judge accepting a guilty plea to determine that "the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory 
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which 
a plea is entered, including the possibility of consecutive sentences." Since the 
docket indicates that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 rights (Exhibit 8), the 
docket entry is prima facie evidence that Peterson was advised of the range of 
punishments he faced as a result of his guilty plea. 
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Again, the testimony in the proceeding below was consistent with the 
docket. Peterson admitted that Judge Kwan told him "that by entering a guilty 
plea in this case that it could be used later on to enhance another conviction." R. 
145:42. Peterson also admitted that Judge Kwan discussed with him "the 
consequences of a guilty plea . . .the fact that you could be sentenced to jail." 
R. 145:50. And Peterson acknowledged that Judge Kwan explained to him "how 
long [Peterson] could be sentenced to jail before [he] entered [his] guilty plea." R. 
145:50. Peterson also executed Exhibit 9, which explains the penalty and 
enhanced penalty applicable to possession of marijuana. Moreover, Peterson 
has never claimed that he did not understand the range of allowable punishments 
attendant to pleading guilty in this case. 
In sum, even if this Court determines that Peterson presented sufficient 
evidence in the district court to overcome the presumption of regularity, the 
information and warnings the Taylorsville Justice Court conveyed to Peterson 
satisfied the Tovar standard. 
3. Peterson's Waiver of Counsel Was Valid Under the Pre-
Tovar Utah Precedent 
Tovar implicitly overruled Utah precedent to the extent it required 
information in addition to the Tovar standard to be conveyed to a defendant 
pleading guilty without counsel. As an example, under pre-Tovar precedent, a 
judge is arguably required to inform a defendant waiving counsel that the 
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defendant will need to comply with technical rules, such as the rules of evidence. 
See State v. Arauelles. 2003 UT 1, H 70, 63 P.3d 731.3 While this type of warning 
would make sense for a criminal defendant proceeding to trial pro se, it has no 
application to a defendant who is simply pleading guilty two days before a 
scheduled trial. Said another way, Tovar clarified that a wooden recitation of 
specific warnings which are irrelevant to pleading guilty is not required. 
Nonetheless, even if the more exacting standards of Utah's pre-Tovar case 
law are considered, Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel was still valid. 
a. Peterson Was Aware of the Dangers and 
Disadvantages of Self-Representation 
Peterson was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation when he waived his right to counsel in this case. As stated by this 
Court, a defendant "'"should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation, so that... he knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eves open."'" Jd. (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 
183, 187 (Utah 1987) (quoting Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). 
3
 Peterson's brief on this appeal (page 42) makes this precise argument: 
Peterson should have been asked about his knowledge of the rules of evidence. 
The rules of evidence have no bearing on a decision to plead guilty without the 
benefit of counsel, although they would certainly be relevant in the context of a 
defendant seeking to waive counsel at trial. 
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Here, Judge Kwan specifically testified that he "was comfortable that 
[Peterson] understood English and he understood what we were talking about 
and he understood the consequences of what he was doing." R: 145:74 
(emphasis added). Judge Kwan formed this opinion based on his close familiarity 
with Peterson on several cases over the year before Peterson signed the Waiver. 
Indeed, Judge Kwan "would not have gone forward" had he "even suspected" that 
Peterson did not understand his rights. R: 145:60. 
Peterson was also intimately familiar with the consequences of pleading 
guilty pro se as a result of his having done so in two cases before the Midvale 
Justice Court approximately six months before he waived his right to counsel in 
this case. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5. Peterson had also pleaded guilty and waived 
counsel in connection with two separate cases in the Taylorsville Justice Court in 
1999, the year before the guilty pleas in the instant case. Exhibit 2; Exhibit 3. 
Peterson was no novice to the criminal justice system and the consequences of 
waiving counsel and pleading guilty to crimes. 
Given this evidence that Peterson was intimately familiar with the dangers 
and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, and the lack of evidence to the 
contrary, the district court's finding that Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel 
was "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent" (R. 118) was entirely appropriate. 
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b. Peterson was Advised of His Right to Counsel, and 
Exercised His Right to Defend Himself 
It is undisputed that Judge Kwan advised Peterson of his right to counsel. 
Peterson testified that Judge Kwan asked if Peterson wanted a lawyer, R. 145:49, 
and Peterson indicated that he did not want a lawyer. kL Peterson also testified 
that Judge Kwan told him that if he "couldn't afford a lawyer and if [he] wanted 
one, the Court would appoint one for [him]." R. 145:42. The Waiver Peterson 
signed also explained Peterson's right to an attorney, and that "[i]f the judge were 
to determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could 
appoint one to represent me." Exhibit 7. Peterson also signed the Application 
(Exhibit 6) which informed Peterson of his right to counsel. 
Peterson argues on this appeal that he was not adequately informed of his 
right to self-representation. Peterson's Brief at 31. But it is beyond dispute that 
Peterson knew of this right, since he in fact exercised it in this case (and other 
cases). It strains credulity for Peterson to suggest that his sentence should be 
overturned because he was not advised of a right that he not only knew of, but in 
fact exercised. 
c. Judge Kwan Ascertained that Peterson Possessed 
the Intelligence and Capacity to Understand and 
Appreciate the Consequences of his Decision to 
Represent Himself 
Judge Kwan was very familiar with Peterson and his capacity when 
Peterson entered his guilty plea on July 18, 2000. R. 145:55, 59. Indeed, 
34 
Peterson had appeared before Judge Kwan at least seven times between March 
and June 27, 2000. Exhibit 8. Peterson testified that he was familiar with Judge 
Kwan by the time he appeared before him on July 18, 2000. R. 145:33. 
Peterson also acknowledged that he "had appeared numerous times in front of 
Judge Kwan" before executing the Waiver. R. 145:41. Peterson had "been a 
defendant" in Judge Kwan's court "for probably over a year on other matters." R. 
145:59. It is within the context of a defendant and a judge who were very familiar 
with each other that Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel must be considered. 
Judge Kwan remained on the bench while Peterson read and signed his 
Waiver. R. 145:74. Judge Kwan testified that he knew "for a fact" that Peterson 
read the Waiver. R. 145:59. 
After Peterson read and signed the Waiver, Judge Kwan asked Peterson if 
he actually read the Waiver, and asked Peterson if he read and understood the 
English language. R. 145:55-56. Peterson conceded that Judge Kwan asked 
Peterson if he read and understood the English language. R. 145:49-50. 
Based on Judge Kwan's close familiarity with Peterson on several cases 
over the year before Peterson signed the Waiver, Judge Kwan concluded that 
Peterson "understood his rights." R. 145:60. Indeed, Judge Kwan "would not 
have gone forward" had he "even suspected" that Peterson did not understand 
his rights, id. Although Judge Kwan did not specifically recall whether he asked 
Peterson about his educational level, by June 18, 2000 Judge Kwan "was 
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comfortable that [Peterson] understood English and understood what we were 
talking about and he understood the consequences of what he was doing." R. 
145:74. Similarly, in Moench v. State. 2004 UT App 57, H 19, the court of 
appeals found that a defendant's waiver of counsel was valid based in part on 
testimony of defendant's attorney "that he was confident that Defendant 
understood the contents of the plea affidavit." 
It is also noteworthy that Peterson was not a novice to the criminal justice 
system, and was not unfamiliar with the concept of pleading guilty and waiving his 
right to counsel. See State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(taking into account that defendant "had previously been involved in a trial" in 
determining defendant intelligently waived his right to counsel); cf State v. 
Valencia. 2001 UT App. 159,1J 22, 27 P.3d 573 (taking into consideration fact 
that defendant "had never experienced a jury trial"). Less than six months before 
Peterson appeared to plead guilty on the charges at issue in the instant case, 
Peterson had appeared before Judge Kwan, pleaded guilty, and waived his right 
to counsel in connection with two separate cases. Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2; Exhibit 3. 
Furthermore, about a month before Peterson pleaded guilty to the charges at 
issue in this case, Peterson appeared in two separate cases in the Midvale 
Justice Court, pleaded guilty, and waived his right to counsel. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5. 
Given Peterson's prior experiences in the Taylorsville Justice Court and 
other courts in waiving his right to counsel, Judge Kwan's close familiarity with 
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Peterson, and the record in the proceeding below, it is apparent that Judge Kwan 
ascertained that Peterson had the intelligence and capacity to understand his 
decision to waive the right to counsel. Indeed, the district court found that "based 
upon the judge's familiarity and experience with Mr. Peterson, he determined that 
Mr. Peterson was able to represent himself." R. 110-11. Notably, Peterson has 
not claimed that he lacked the intelligence or capacity to understand what he was 
doing on July 18, 2000. Since there is evidence that Peterson's waiver was 
intelligent, and no evidence to the contrary, the district court did not err in finding 
that Peterson's waiver of the right to counsel was intelligent. R. 118. 
d. Judge Kwan Ascertained that Peterson 
Comprehended the Nature of the Charges and 
Proceedings and the Range of Permissible 
Punishments 
It is beyond dispute that Peterson was informed of the nature of the charges 
against him and the range of permissible punishments. The docket of the 
Taylorsville Justice Court alone satisfies this requirement. The docket indicated 
that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 rights. Likewise, the district court found 
that Judge Kwan completed two Rule 11 colloquies with Peterson on July 18, 
2000. R. 115. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) provides in part that a court may not accept 
a guilty plea unless the judge has found that "the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered ..." Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11(e)(4)(A). This rule also requires the court to determine that "the defendant 
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knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum 
mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(5). Since the docket 
entry constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts stated, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-
122 (2002), the docket is prima facie evidence that Peterson was advised of the 
nature of the charges against him and the range of permissible punishments. 
Moreover, Peterson's own testimony establishes that he knew of the range 
of punishments he could face by pleading guilty. Peterson admitted that Judge 
Kwan told him "that by entering a guilty plea in this case that it could be used later 
on to enhance another conviction." R. 145:42. Peterson also admitted that Judge 
Kwan discussed with him "the consequences of a guilty plea . . .the fact that you 
could be sentenced to jail." R. 145:50. And Peterson acknowledged that Judge 
Kwan explained to him "how long [Peterson] could be sentenced to jail before [he] 
entered [his] guilty plea." R. 145:50. In addition to this colloquy, Peterson 
executed Exhibit 9, which explains the penalty and enhanced penalty applicable to 
possession of marijuana. 
The evidence in the district court also demonstrated that Peterson was 
informed of the nature of the charges against him. Peterson signed Exhibit 9, 
which indicates that Peterson was charged with Possession of Controlled 
Substance (marijuana). Moreover, when Judge Kwan called his cases, he reads 
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to the defendant "the charges, the date that it allegedly occurred, location." R. 
145:55. It is also clear that Peterson knew the nature of the charges against him 
based on his executing the Waiver, which stated at the top that the charges 
against him were "POCS + PODP," or possession of controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. Exhibit 7. 
In short, there was ample evidence to demonstrate that Peterson's guilty 
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, even if the factors considered by pre-
Tovar Utah decisions are considered. The district court correctly concluded that 
Peterson "made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel," 
(R. 118), and therefore the court of appeals decision should be affirmed, should 
the Court reach the merits of Peterson's Petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no evidence in the record that Peterson did not waive his right to 
counsel, or that Peterson's waiver was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. 
Under these circumstances, Peterson's counsel's argument that his waiver 
violated the Sixth Amendment is not facially plausible, and accordingly there are 
no unusual circumstances present to justify Peterson's collateral attack on his 
sentence. Even if the Court were to consider the merits of Peterson's request for 
post-conviction relief, given that not even a scintilla of evidence supports 
Peterson's claim that he was deprived of his right to counsel, the presumption of 
regularity must prevail. This Court should affirm the court of appeals' alternative 
holdings that Peterson did not demonstrate that unusual circumstances existed to 
justify post-conviction relief, and that on the merits Peterson failed to meet his 
burden to prove a violation of his right to counsel. 
Respectfully Submitted this 26th day of September, 2007. 
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS 
A Professional Corporation 
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George B. Hofmann 
Attorneys for the Taylorsville Justice Court 
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